The Supreme Court (SC) today upheld a High Court order that disqualified seven candidates, mostly from BNP, from contesting in the general election slated for December 30.
Chamber Judge of Appellate Division Justice Md Nuruzzaman passed “no order” on separatewrit petitions filed by the candidates seeking stay on the HC order.
The six BNP candidates are: Fazlur Rahmanfor Rajshahi-1, Faridul Kabir Talukder for Jamalpur-4, Abdul Majid for Jhenidah-2, Abu Sayeed Chand for Rajshahi-6,Nadim Mustafafor Rajshahi-5 and Khandaker Abu Ashfaq for Dhaka-1.
The other candidate is Mahmud Hasan Suman (independent) for Myemensingh-1.
Following separate writ petitions,the HC recently stayed the Election Commission’s decision that allowed them to contest the election.
Writ petitioner’s lawyer advocate Shah ManjurulHaq told reporters that the candidates cannot run the polls following today’s order.
The Supreme Court (SC) today upheld a High Court order that disqualified seven candidates, mostly from BNP, from contesting in the general election slated for December 30.
Chamber Judge of Appellate Division Justice Md Nuruzzaman passed “no order” on separatewrit petitions filed by the candidates seeking stay on the HC order.
The six BNP candidates are: Fazlur Rahmanfor Rajshahi-1, Faridul Kabir Talukder for Jamalpur-4, Abdul Majid for Jhenidah-2, Abu Sayeed Chand for Rajshahi-6,Nadim Mustafafor Rajshahi-5 and Khandaker Abu Ashfaq for Dhaka-1.
The other candidate is Mahmud Hasan Suman (independent) for Myemensingh-1.
Following separate writ petitions,the HC recently stayed the Election Commission’s decision that allowed them to contest the election.
Writ petitioner’s lawyer advocate Shah ManjurulHaq told reporters that the candidates cannot run the polls following today’s order.
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This year, the Victory Day feels particularly significant due to this year's powerful uprising. To commemorate this special day, here are some events to help you embrace the spirit of patriotism.
Among them is a special concert titled "Shobar Agey Bangladesh", organised by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), taking place today at Manik Mia Avenue.
The concert will feature artistes including Syed Abdul Hadi, Khurshid Alam, Kanak Chapa, Baby Naznin, Monir Khan, Kona, Imran, Pritom, Mousumi, and Xefer. Additionally, popular bands such as Nagarbaul, Ark, Shironamhin, Artcell, Avoid Rafa, Different Touch, and Souls will also perform.
Bangladesh Shilpakala Academy has organised a day-long program to celebrate Victory Day, featuring a month-long exhibition titled "2024: Oi Notuner Keton Ure". This exhibition showcases posters, paintings, photographs, videos, and cartoons that capture various aspects of the July uprising. It aims to create a comprehensive archive documenting student and public protests, the fall of authoritarian regimes, and dynamic movements through wall writings, murals, and photographic records. Cultural Adviser Mostofa Sarwar Farooki will inaugurate the exhibition at 7 pm.
A special dance performance, titled "Mora Jhonjhar Moto Uddam" will be presented by artists from the Bangladesh Dancers' Foundation. Renowned singer Ferdous Ara will also perform a special solo musical performance, alongside band performances by Artcell and Lalon.
If you prefer to stay home and enjoy some uplifting movies and music on TV, here's a list of programmes you can look forward to.
Banglavision will feature a special guest, renowned singer Shaheen Samad, on their morning program "Din Protidin." An esteemed artiste of the Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra, who played a key role in motivating millions during the 1971 Liberation War, Shaheen Samad will share inspiring stories of the freedom fighters and reflect on the experiences of Victory Day. She will also discuss her dreams about music and the current state of affairs. The program will air at 8:30 am today.
Boishakhi TV will broadcast a special drama titled "Birongona", starring Aparna Ghose as Birongona. The drama highlights the sacrifices and struggles faced by the unsung heroes of 1971. The cast also includes Rawnak Hasan, Manoj Pramanik, Riya Khan, and Monir Zaman in key roles. It will air at 10:30 pm today.
At 10:00 am, "Hangor Nodi Grenade," directed by Chashi Nazrul Islam and starring Sohel Rana, Suchorita, and Rajib, will be telecast. At 2:30 pm, the movie "Alor Michil", directed by Narayan Ghosh Mita and featuring Anwar Hossain, Babita, Razzak, and Sujata, will also air.
Bangladesh Television (BTV) has arranged a range of special programmes, including documentaries, children's shows, dance performances, musical events, self-composed poetry recitals and dramas.
BTV will broadcast the special drama "Chobi Kotha Bole" at 9:05 PM, starring Kazi Asad, Momena Chowdhury, AK Azad Shetu, Sallha Khanam Nadia, Sabbir Ahmed, and others.
Channel i will air the Impress Telefilm production "Oggatonama", directed by Tauquir Ahmed, at 3:05 PM. Additionally, a special telefilm titled "Tumi Asbe Bole" will be broadcast at 9:35 PM.
At 10:15 am, "Sphulingo" will be aired, starring Pori Moni, Zakia Bari Mamo, and Shamol Mawla. At 2:10 pm, the movie "Bhuban Majhi" will be shown, featuring Parambrata Chattopadhyay and Aparna Ghose in the lead roles.
At Maasranga Television, a special drama titled "Shesh Prohor" will air at 10:30 pm. Directed by Chayanika Chowdhury, the drama stars Shashwata Datta, Aisha Khan, Abul Hayat, and others.
Between 1991, when democracy was restored in Bangladesh, and 2009, the Awami League and the BNP were each twice elected to office, through free, fair and inclusive elections. Unfortunately, the tenures of either party did not conspicuously serve to promote the practice of democracy and appeared to be more preoccupied with consolidating power and perpetuating a winner-take-all political culture.
In the backdrop of a bipartisan political system, the BNP has emerged as the largest political party in the country. In the absence of the AL in the political arena, in the aftermath of the post-July-August uprising, the prospect of the BNP forming the next government through a free and fair election appear propitious. Public attention is naturally focused on whether they will return as improved practitioners of democracy. In the aftermath of the uprising, remarks made by top BNP leaders on the state, governance, and practice of democracy project a renovated image of the party and has been widely appreciated by the public. However, the spectacle of the party's field-level workers moving to fill the power vacuum created by the exit of the AL from the field and appropriating the vacated opportunities for rent-seeking have aroused some concern that old habits die hard. Punitive actions by the BNP leadership against malfeasant party members do not appear to have done enough to discourage such predatory actions. Popular discontent against such misbehaviour suggests that the BNP leadership needs to act more decisively to discipline their party cadres if they are to persuade the public of their reformed identity.
In contrast, the forces which came together to overthrow the AL regime represent a fresh presence in politics and have generated their own political dynamic where a younger generation has begun to assert itself. The students have earned respect and legitimacy through their vanguard role in the July-August uprising, particularly among the younger people. They have been justifiably concerned that the old political order should not be perpetuated and demand that substantive reforms take place to ensure that a new, more just, and equitable order emerges. They have welcomed the reforms initiated by Prof Yunus but aspire to be more actively engaged in carrying forward the reform process. To do so, a segment of the students have launched a political party, the National Citizen Party (NCP). This is a welcome step.
Bangladesh has long needed a third party to challenge the duopoly exercised by the AL and the BNP for the last four decades, which has tribalised national politics. Prof Yunus made a rather mistimed and misconceived effort to establish such a third party in 2007. Its early demise did not rule out the need for a political force which would challenge the hegemony of the two parties. Jamaat is indeed another such force of political consequence. But its politics so far have been targeted to a specific ideological rather than a national constituency. It may now have wider aspirations to reach out to a broader spectrum of voters and promises to be a significant force in the forthcoming national election.
The emergence of the NCP as a prospective challenger to our dynastic politics has the attraction of novelty and the virtue of not carrying any baggage from past involvements in governance. To capitalise on such assets, the NCP would be advised to project itself as the party of the future, rather than re-fighting historical battles. Some of the student leaders have so far invested much rhetoric over rewriting the constitution and proclaiming a second (?) republic. As it transpires, their five-point declaration on displacing the four fundamental principles that have underwritten the Bangladesh constitution appears to be a largely semantic exercise, which says nothing that is not already inherent to the original fundamental principles of the constitution. Such provisions as "pluralism" are integral to the ideas of democracy and secularism. The provision of "equality" and "social justice" are essential components of the idea of socialism. Such a move to engage in constitutional dialectics appears to be driven more by a desire to re-interpret history than to redefine the fundamental values guiding the national mission.
The preoccupation of the students in engaging in such a historical discourse has left limited opportunity for them to spell out how they aspire to create a society committed to eradicate boishomyo or inequality. It has also distracted them from what should have been their primary responsibility in the post-August 5 period, providing backup to the Yunus-led interim government (IG) in restoring stability to the ravaged socio-economic landscape of Bangladesh. They could have, through organising students groups, served as a reinforcement to the weakened law enforcement agencies. They could have shown an active commitment towards challenging boishomyo by drawing attention to the problems of vulnerable groups, and could have been more proactive in protecting such groups against acts of oppression and exploitation. Such initiatives would have given the students both visibility and credibility as a new force committed to change—not just through words but actions. Such a hands-on role in civic activism would have helped to define their political identity and widened their support base beyond their student's constituency.
One of the enduring messages of politics is to fight the right war at the right time. As a consequence of their incapacity over the last several months to project a more clearly articulated vision for the future, the student movement has lost some of its lustre. The NCP's capacity to reach out to the mass of students who participated in the July-August uprising is eroding as various sections of the student's movement have remained reluctant to follow them into the NCP. It should be recognised that students are not a homogenous class with shared political views. Their immediate goal is to study, pass exams, and enter the job market, so political engagement remains a passing commitment.
To retain its student base and broaden its outreach, the NCP needs to recapture the dynamism of the July-August movement. To do this, they need to establish their political autonomy and project their promise of delivering a fresh agenda before the people. In practice, the NCP has already unnecessarily engaged themselves in the same historical dialectics which frustrated the emergence of a more workable two-party democratic system.
The NCP is already politically identifying itself on such issues as the urgency of elections (not high) and antagonism towards India, where its position is closer to the JI. The emerging political contradiction today pits the NCP and the JI against the BNP, which daily demands an early election, which it expects to win comfortably in the absence of AL as a major challenge. In contrast, the NCP needs more time to build their party, so they argue that reforms should be initiated and implemented before elections are convened, a position supported by the JI but strongly resisted by the BNP, who views this position as a delaying tactic for elections.
As the NCP moves ahead to prepare for elections, whenever they may be, it is facing up to one of the realities of Bangladeshi politics which have sadly not been resolved by any of the reform commissions. It needs to build up a sizeable war chest to contest elections. The party should, however, aim to build an election fund for itself that is above board and transparent, creating an example that other political parties can follow.
The preoccupation of the students in engaging in such a historical discourse has left limited opportunity for them to spell out how they aspire to create a society committed to eradicate boishomyo or inequality. It has also distracted them from what should have been their primary responsibility in the post-August 5 period, providing backup to the Yunus-led interim government (IG) in restoring stability to the ravaged socio-economic landscape of Bangladesh.
Reforms versus elections
Yunus is himself a strong believer in the need for reforms, but his promise to hold free and fair elections remains his most tangible commitment to the people of Bangladesh since it remains his most realisable objective. He has indicated that elections may take place between December 2025 and June 2026. This target is still to be firmed up and a roadmap clearly laid out to take the country towards elections. But there appear to be pitfalls ahead which could complicate the design of a clear guidepost.
Yunus sensibly argues that holding free and fair elections may serve little purpose if the inherited state of political malgovernance is perpetuated. Such a position, which is possibly widely shared, particularly among the students, indicates a lack of confidence in the credibility of the promises made by various political parties, but more specifically the BNP, that they are committed to structural reforms.
Yunus and the students demand substantive institutional reforms, which can bring about real change. To this end, he has set up a number of commissions populated by well-known and respected intellectuals and retired bureaucrats to recommend institutional reforms in such areas as the constitution, judiciary, public administration, police, an anti-corruption commission, an election commission, media, women's affairs, local government, health, and a task force as well as a White Paper on the economy. Many commendable reform proposals have emanated from these bodies. Surprisingly, the students/youth have been underrepresented in these commissions. Nor has there been adequate representation of women and religious or ethnic minority groups in the commissions.
It is one thing to write up reforms on paper and quite another to secure political consensus on reforms as well as to operationalise them. The IG has constituted a so-called Consensus Commission, made up of the chairs of the six commissions, headed by Yunus, and coordinated by the chair of the Commission on Constitutional Reforms, which has been empowered to draw up a concise agenda of reforms distilled from the reports of the various commissions. This agenda is to then be presented to and discussed with the political parties to establish a consensus behind the reforms.
Such a route to reform appears unusual because it does not involve either Yunus or his interim government in participating in or guiding the political task of consensus-building. As a result, the reform agenda is not identified with Yunus or his government and is the outcome of the diverse views of six different groups of experts who have themselves not been mandated to establish coherence in their particular vision for reform. It is the Consensus Commission which has now been invested by Yunus with the political challenge of building consensual support for the reforms among a heterogenous group of politicians with widely disparate electoral support and political agendas.
The initial modus operandi of the Consensus Commission has yielded a spreadsheet which puts together their proposed reform agenda in a synoptic form of 167 itemised questions on specific reforms, which are expected to be answered by each party through a quiz format limited to responses through tick-marking one of three possible options: "agree," "disagree," or "partially disagree." There is also a box attached to each question for parties to attach comments, if any, relating to the proposed reform.
Beyond indicating their preferences on each reform proposal, the political parties are also expected to tick-mark their preferred options for implementing the reforms whether by executive order of the IG, an elected constitutional assembly, or to be left to an elected parliament. This complex set of governance challenges are also spelt out in synoptic form in the spreadsheet. As anyone who has conducted such US-style examinations knows, such a process may not be able to capture the nuances and complexities which underlie each question. Nor does the spreadsheet provide scope for discussing the process through which each reform will need to be enacted and eventually implemented. Converting a "yes" response to a single-line reform proposal into a policy or legislative programme is thus likely to be a much more challenging process than preparing a commission report.
Most of the political parties, including the BNP, JI and NCP, have responded to this scholastic interrogation. It is not clear how the Consensus Commission will evaluate their answers or how they will weigh responses from the many parties with negligible electoral support and the few that command nationwide electoral support. Nor is it clear as to how the IG will relate to the consensus-building of the commission since Yunus and the IG are currently the only available institutional body with the power to move towards enacting reforms based on the evaluation of the questionnaire and consultation with the political parties.
While some reforms, classified as "low-hanging fruits," can be picked for immediate implementation by the IG, the process of actually operationalising even these reforms to a point where they yield results on the ground is likely to take time. Reforms, if they are to be carried out, will thus largely depend on the commitment and political perspective of whichever party or coalition wins the forthcoming elections and their capacity to implement the reforms. In such an undefined universe for enacting and implementing reforms by the Yunus government, the debate over reforms versus elections is somewhat theoretical and reflects contesting political strategies rather than policy differences.
Moves by the IG, under pressure from the NCP and their allies, to ban the AL or keep them out of the elections is likely to be open to contestation, both legally and politically, within the country. Nor may it find favour at the international level, particularly within the UN system. The UN has called for an inclusive election. India, in particular, is likely to make an inclusive election into an issue of both bilateral and international concern. It should be kept in mind that the exclusion of a major party such as the BNP from contesting the national elections of 2014 and 2024 and the fraudulence of the 2018 election put the legitimacy of the AL-led regime at the national and global levels under challenge throughout the last decade.
The elephant in the room
Within this still-evolving scenario, the elephant in the room remains the Awami League. The NCP wants to ban the AL. The BNP rather ambiguously argues that AL's fate should be decided by the people or the courts, whatever this means. The BNP is inhibited from taking a categorical position on this issue at this time. It would ideally like to claim that it fought a freely contested election fairly defeating all comers, particularly the AL. The party reckons a banned AL would remain a permanent source of agitation on the streets, better positioned to challenge a victorious BNP government, more so than an electorally defeated party. However, the path towards drawing the AL into the electoral arena, with its leadership in exile and other leaders and activists largely in hiding or incarcerated, remains uncertain.
How far the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) will be able to convict and sentence a significant number of AL leaders, apart from SH, through a credible judicial process remains to be seen. Many of these AL leaders, whether as ministers or MPs, may also be expected to be held accountable for various acts of corruption. This would also need to be done through a judicial process which may determine their eligibility for contesting elections.
Moving from jail cells and remand to the courtroom and passing sentence in Bangladesh is a time-consuming process if it is to be done within the rule of law. So AL's capacity to eventually contest elections remains a grey area. If such issues are resolved in time and the AL is permitted to contest, with the right to campaign on the streets for their nominated candidates, take out processions, and organise public meeting, this is likely to introduce a highly incendiary element into the electoral campaign.
Moves by the IG, under pressure from the NCP and their allies, to ban the AL or keep them out of the elections is likely to be open to contestation, both legally and politically, within the country. Nor may it find favour at the international level, particularly within the UN system. The UN has called for an inclusive election. India, in particular, is likely to make an inclusive election into an issue of both bilateral and international concern. It should be kept in mind that the exclusion of a major party such as the BNP from contesting the national elections of 2014 and 2024 and the fraudulence of the 2018 election put the legitimacy of the AL-led regime at the national and global levels under challenge throughout the last decade. The exclusion of a major political party such as the AL, however discredited it may be, is hardly likely to keep the forthcoming elections immune from challenge.
Bangladesh is today led by Muhammad Yunus, a universally respected person of unquestioned integrity. FILE PHOTO: PID
Prof Yunus recently said that the next election in Bangladesh would be the most free and fair. In this context, we can recall that in 1991, the Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed caretaker government, of which I was privileged to be a member, received much applause both at home and abroad for holding a free, fair, peaceful, and fully inclusive election. In that election, the ousted military dictator HM Ershad's Jatiya Party won 35 seats in parliament. Ershad himself won in five constituencies while he was under house arrest in Gulshan. A veteran Indian journalist, Nikhil Chakravarty, editor of the weekly Mainstream, who was a member of a team of election observers, termed the Shahabuddin election as the freest and fairest election he had witnessed in his lifetime.
The pathway to national elections, whether in December 2025 or in 2026, is not likely to be so smooth. Whenever the election campaign hits the streets, we will get a sense of how far the attempt by the IG to build a consensus to ensure a more peaceful political process has built up any traction. The contested social and political landscape is already manifesting itself through the growing visibility of attempts by extremist forces to use the more congenial environment provided by the IG to more openly express themselves. This has created an increasing sense of insecurity for women in public spaces and an enhanced sense of vulnerability for indigenous and religious minorities. Threats of violence voiced by extremist groups and expatriate influencers using social media indicate that the freedom to practise a particular brand of politics or voice uncomfortable opinions can no longer be taken for granted. If such acts of violence are to remain a relevant factor in the practice of democracy, even under the Yunus-led government, the emergence of a reformed democratic order based on public reasoning is going to remain elusive.
In this fast-evolving political environment, the IG may find that its most challenging agenda remains to prevent a further deterioration in the condition of the economy and to bring about some visible improvements within their tenure. While some improvements in the economy have been registered under the IG, the recent decision by the Trump administration to expose Bangladesh's principal exports to a regime of high tariffs has added a further element of uncertainty for the IG's management of the economy. The law and order situation remains a matter of continuing concern. Failure to effectively manage the economy and the law and order situation could erode the credibility and authority of the IG, which remains crucial to ensure a transition to a free and fair election with a peaceful transfer of power to an elected government.
Fortunately, prospects for change are not without hope. Bangladesh is today led by Muhammad Yunus, a universally respected person of unquestioned integrity. Attempts across the border to paint him as an intolerant fundamentalist with a hunger for power lack credibility and hence appear tendentious in intent. His presence as the head of the IG has provided the country with a rare moment where governance and policy decisions are largely made not for personal benefits, but for the greater good. Some of these decisions may be unwise, governance may be deficient in some areas, but the commitment of the regime remains sincere. If such a regime cannot lead the way towards substantive change, then Bangladesh may indeed face another era of disappointment and discontent.
Prof Rehman Sobhan, one of Bangladesh's most distinguished economists and a celebrated public intellectual, is founder and chairman of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called on all stakeholders to ensure an environment free of violence, intimidation and coercion before, during and after Sunday's general election in Bangladesh.
In the run-up to the polls, he said an environment free from violence would help enable a peaceful, credible and inclusive election.
In a statement yesterday, Stephane Dujarric, the spokesman for UN secretary-general, said, “All Bangladeshi citizens, including minorities and women, must feel safe and confident in exercising their right to vote. Civil society and electoral observers should be fully supported to play their role in the process.”
Ahead of the upcoming elections in Bangladesh, @antonioguterres calls for an environment free of violence, intimidation and coercion. All Bangladeshis, including minorities & women, must feel safe and confident in exercising their right to vote. full text: https://t.co/bMQIDBtozh
Guterres also reiterates the continued commitment of the United Nations to support a peaceful and democratic Bangladesh, it added.
The call for a peaceful and free, fair and inclusive election comes at a time when violence continues across the country before the 11th parliamentary election.
Last week, the UN said it is closely following the situation ahead of the polls in Bangladesh.
On December 10, Dujarric said, “We believe, as a matter of principles, that elections should be held in a positive climate, free from any sort of intimidation.”
In another development, the US yesterday expressed concern by the high level of campaign violence over the last two weeks.
Talking to reporters after a meeting with Chief Election Commissioner KM Nurul Huda at the Election Commission Secretariat, US Ambassador Earl Miller said he asked for this meeting because the US is concerned by the high level of campaign violence over the last two weeks, says an embassy statement.
All parties have been victims of violence, including minorities and female candidates. However, it appears opposition party candidates have borne the brunt of most violence, he said.
Miller added, “I appreciated the opportunity to consult with the Election Commission to see what plans it has to create a conducive atmosphere, so all Bangladeshis, no matter their political affiliation, feel safe to go to the polls on Sunday and cast their votes for the candidates of their choice.
“Bangladesh is rightfully proud of its democratic traditions, including elections where upwards of 70 percent of the electorate turns out to vote. In any democratic election there must be space for peaceful expression and assembly; for independent media to do its job covering electoral developments; for participants to have access to information; and for all individuals to be able to partake in the electoral process without harassment, intimidation, or violence.”
The US wishes all Bangladeshis a free, fair, tolerant and peaceful election day on Sunday, the envoy added.
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BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia boarded a flight to the UK for medical treatment a few hours after her scheduled departure. The delay was caused by the thousands who thronged the highway to bid her farewell. The ensuing traffic jam inconvenienced commuters, no doubt, but it was an outpouring of love and support from her admirers and followers. On the same day, the Bangladesh government revoked 97 passports, including that of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who is now exiled in India, having fled after a massive political upsurge.
Just six months ago, the tables were completely turned. Khaleda was under house arrest, while her party was desperately appealing for her to be allowed to travel for medical care. The request was denied many times. Meanwhile, Sheikh Hasina held an iron grip on power, with no one daring to challenge her.
Since Hasina's government came to power, Khaleda had endured relentless verbal attacks but remained largely silent, maintaining a quiet dignity even as Hasina's words often struck with sharp venom. The two women, both giants of Bangladesh's political landscape, share a bitter rivalry, yet their communication styles couldn't be more different—Hasina is known for her fiery, often harsh tone, while Khaleda is known for remaining calm and calculated, rarely engaging in public verbal sparring.
Khaleda Zia's troubles began in 2009 when her archrival Hasina assumed office. The first blow came when Khaleda was forcibly evicted from her Dhaka cantonment house, which she had called home for decades. In a tearful press conference at her Gulshan office, Khaleda accused the government of dragging her out of her bedroom, breaking down her door, and leaving her with nothing but the clothes she was wearing. Awami League leaders, including Hasina herself, dismissed her emotional plea as nothing more than "crocodile tears."
The political climate grew more hostile. On December 29, 2013, as the BNP declared its "March for Democracy" ahead of the controversial January 5, 2014, elections, Khaleda's path was blocked by five sand-laden trucks ordered by the government to prevent her from attending the rally. The sight of the trucks—now infamous in Bangladesh's political history as "sand-truck democracy"—left Khaleda frustrated and powerless. It was the first time she was out of parliament since she began parliamentary politics in 1990. While she was visibly upset, her fury was directed not at Hasina but at the female police officers who had managed to irritate her. In a brief moment of exasperation, Khaleda lashed out in a rare outburst. The only other time Khaleda appeared ungracious was when Hasina wanted to offer condolences for the death of Arafat, Khaleda's younger son. The sitting prime minister was turned back from the locked gates of Khaleda's Gulshan house.
Khaleda's journey took an even darker turn when she was imprisoned on corruption charges filed during the army-backed caretaker government. Meanwhile, Hasina, when she came to power, had all charges against her cleared, even as Khaleda languished in Dhaka Central Jail. Hasina, ever vocal, repeatedly mocked Khaleda, calling her a "thief" and claiming she deserved the punishment she received. Hasina would often declare, while mocking the BNP's political efforts: "Now they're marching for a thief."
Ironically, however, the international media has reported massive corruption allegations against Hasina's cabinet and even her niece, who is a British MP.
Hasina even issued threats that any attempt by the BNP to step up its movement would result in Khaleda being thrown back into prison, deepening the political animosity between the two women and fuelling a bitter feud that shaped Bangladesh's political landscape. Even after sending her to jail, Hasina did not refrain from making harsh comments. Earlier in 2022, she even remarked that Khaleda Zia should be "thrown" off the Padma Bridge. At a programme in London in October 2023, Hasina further said, "Khaleda Zia is over 80 years old, and there is news every day that she is on the verge of dying." She then questioned the point of crying over her health.
Hasina's ungracious comments weren't limited to Khaleda. She also targeted other prominent figures, including Muhammad Yunus, who is currently the chief adviser to the interim government. She infamously labelled Yunus a "bloodsucker of the poor." Moreover, during the student protests in late July, Hasina's reaction was far from empathetic. Instead of listening to the youth's grievances, she blamed the students and ordered the police to crack down hard on the protesters.
Ultimately, Hasina was forced to flee the country. Despite her repeated declarations that she would never leave, she fled Bangladesh in the face of mass public anger, abandoning millions of her party loyalists who were left in disarray.
On the other hand, Khaleda Zia departed the country amid a spontaneous farewell fit for a respected leader after years of hardship. Despite that, Khaleda chose not to lash out against Hasina. Instead, she called for "no destruction, no anger, and no revenge," urging the need for love and peace to rebuild the nation.
In a world where silence hardly prevails, Khaleda Zia's restraint became her strength. When the autocratic regime sought to break her, it was the people who showered her with love. This quiet yet powerful defiance set her apart from others.
Where others saw defeat, Khaleda saw an opportunity. As Hasina fled in the face of overwhelming public dissent, Khaleda was met with the kind of love and support that transcended years of political conflict. In choosing peace over revenge and dialogue over destruction, she set an example that speaks louder than words.
Of all the five major political figures in Bangladesh's history—Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Ziaur Rahman, HM Ershad, Khaleda Zia, and Sheikh Hasina—it is only Khaleda Zia who has managed to avoid the label of an autocrat. This distinction is a significant defining aspect of her political legacy.
At a time when politics often rewards the loudest voice, Khaleda Zia's legacy serves as a reminder that silence, too, can be golden. It is this quiet strength that will echo through Bangladesh's history, ensuring that she is not just remembered but also revered.
Mohammad Al-Masum Molla is a journalist of The Daily Star.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
Sheikh Hasina's flight from Bangladesh under duress marked a momentous "event"—a term philosopher Alain Badiou employs to describe a "radical rupture" in the historical and political fabric. Her ignominious ouster, following a popular uprising, exposed deep political fractures. It seemed to signify the end of an era dominated by her authoritarian rule. Yet, its aftermath lingers like the spectral presence of a purloined letter: visible yet elusive, significant yet unresolved. Her escape, an act unfolding in plain sight, remains steeped in symbolic implications, clouded by the political and social dynamics it unleashed.
In Jacques Lacan's reading of Edgar Allan Poe's The Purloined Letter, the "lost letter" symbolises a hidden truth that remains elusive despite being in plain view. It is not absent in a literal sense, but displaced and misinterpreted. Similarly, Hasina's "purloined escape" embodies an act both present and absent. While her departure is a visible fact, its underlying significance remains deferred—a symbol open to multiple interpretations. Like the purloined letter, her flight disrupts the established order, evoking uncertainty and perpetuating the structures of power and resistance it was meant to dismantle.
Hasina's absence exemplifies Lacan's concept of deferred meaning, where significance is perpetually postponed. In Poe's story, the ongoing search for the letter creates the illusion of stability despite underlying turmoil. Similarly, Hasina's escape transforms her from a political leader into a symbolic figure whose influence lingers in her absence. The question of moving forward while grappling with the structures she left behind remains unresolved, caught in the paradox of her "absence of presence" and "presence of absence."
Entrenched binaries and deferred relevance
Major political parties, notably the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, struggle to assert relevance, clinging to their unforeseen adversarial posture. Despite, or perhaps because of, Hasina's dramatic departure, they remain entrenched in the binary opposition of Awami League versus BNP, failing to adapt to a shifting political reality. Their efforts to position themselves against the interim government, already accused of being mired in inefficiency and elitism, ironically amplify Hasina's lingering influence.
This inability to evolve underscores their reliance on a familiar, albeit antiquated, political script. Rather than reimagining their roles in a post-Hasina polity, they perpetuate old rivalries, allowing her symbolic shadow to dominate. Their reluctance to transcend the oppositional framework—built on decades of political polarisation—delays the potential for meaningful reform. In this stasis, they fail to address systemic challenges that demand attention, undermining their relevance in an evolving political landscape.
Revolutionary fervour meets institutional inertia
Meanwhile, the students who spearheaded the July uprising face the daunting task of translating revolutionary fervour into institutional change. The inertia of the very systems they sought to dismantle threatens to co-opt their idealism, reducing their efforts to yet another cog in the machinery of political stagnation. While their aspirations to launch a new political party reflect a desire for transformation, these efforts risk dilution through compromises with questionable political stakeholders, potentially undermining their revolutionary ethos.
The students' struggle is emblematic of a broader challenge: the collision between transformative aspirations and entrenched political structures. Their movement, though a catalyst for Hasina's ouster, now faces the task of sustaining momentum in a landscape rife with obstacles. The risk of becoming subsumed by existing political dynamics looms large, threatening to erode the revolutionary potential they embody.
The interim government: Navigating fragile terrain
The interim government—tasked with navigating this fraught transition—bears the weight of stabilising a fractured polity. Yet, the entrenched remnants of Sheikh Hasina's regime, particularly within the business and civil-military bureaucracies, persist. These institutions, far from collapsing, perpetuate an illusion of continuity. Their complicity reinforces the structures Hasina built, making her absence paradoxically more pronounced. In this sense, her symbolic presence haunts the nation's politics, raising doubts about whether genuine change is possible or if the illusion of her authority will endure.
The interim government's inefficiency and elitism further complicate this precarious moment. Its increasing connivance of, if not entanglement with, entrenched interests limits its capacity to enact transformative reforms, perpetuating the structures that enabled Hasina's authoritarian rule.
Historical reckonings and structural flaws
This moment must be contextualised within Bangladesh's broader historical trajectory. Sheikh Hasina's rule was characterised by consolidation of power, suppression of dissent, and the erosion of democratic institutions. Her escape represents not only a political rupture but also a profound challenge to the nation's collective psyche. It forces a reckoning with the deep-seated issues that allowed her authoritarian regime to thrive.
The remnants of Hasina's centralised power structure—entwined with businesses, civil and military bureaucracies, and law enforcement—pose a formidable challenge. These institutions must not merely adapt to her absence, but critically interrogate the systems that sustained her rule. Bangladesh's true challenge lies not in pursuing the illusory stability of her presence, but in confronting the foundational flaws that perpetuated her authority.
The lessons of The Purloined Letter remind us that the endless pursuit of illusory truths delays meaningful progress. Bangladesh must look beyond Hasina's absence to address the systemic issues that sustained her rule. Only by doing so can the nation hope to transcend the shadow of her legacy and build a more accountable and democratic future.
The stakes are high, and the path ahead is fraught with uncertainty. Yet, within this uncertainty lies the potential for transformation—a chance to reclaim agency and forge a new political order. Hasina's escape, like the purloined letter, is a conspicuous truth resisting resolution. The pressing question remains: will Bangladesh seize this moment to confront its past and shape a new future, or remain trapped in cycles of deferred meaning and contested power?
The shadow of authority: Lacanian insights on deferred meaning
Lacan's notion of deferred meaning, grounded in the idea that meaning is always postponed through language and its inherent instability, provides a powerful lens through which to view the political situation in Bangladesh under Hasina's leadership. Her physical absence may be a clear reality, but the symbolic structures and institutions she built persist in shaping the political and social landscape. This creates a tension where the country is caught between the absence of a visible, authoritative figure and the continued, often oppressive, presence of the systems she put in place.
In Lacanian terms, Hasina's absence operates like the petit objet a, the object-cause of desire—an absence that nonetheless fuels desire and longing, as it remains unfulfilled. In this case, her absence becomes the catalyst for political stagnation and potential change. It paralyses the public, as they remain fixated on her legacy and the systems she left behind, unable to move past them. This paralysis is akin to the feeling of being trapped in the shadows of a once-dominant figure, where the country remains obsessed with a past it cannot escape.
Yet, Lacan also suggests that absence can open the door to a new kind of freedom. Just as Poe's The Purloined Letter remains hidden in plain sight, so too does the potential for transformation in Bangladesh. The systems that continue to operate in Hasina's name are not static—they are open to reinterpretation. But for this to happen, there must be a willingness to confront the shadows she left behind and embrace the ambiguity of her symbolic absence. The unresolved question is whether Bangladesh can move beyond the constraint of her legacy and reimagine its political future in a way that is not tied to her shadow.
This process of redefining the nation would require confronting the fragmented meanings that linger in the wake of Hasina's influence. Lacan's theory reminds us that meaning is never stable; it is in constant flux, deferred, and subject to reinterpretation. The challenge for Bangladesh lies in whether it can seize the opportunity created by the gap left by Hasina's absence to reconstruct its identity on its own terms, no longer defined by the shadow of its former leader. This involves not just dismantling the systems of power she established but also reimagining the underlying symbols that continue to shape its political consciousness. Only then can the country begin the difficult process of liberating itself from the ideological structures that still hold sway and begin anew in a post-Hasina era.
Dr Faridul Alam writes from New York City, US.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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