It would be very unfair to the security and defence planners to work on the premise or basis that was described in the paper, with its entire focus on one aspect of the threat. That would limit our reaction to only one source of threat, while excluding from our consideration other possible sources that are likely to impinge upon the well-being of the state. It would be disastrous to do so.

There is not always a direct correlation between physical contiguity and threat. Threats can also emanate from those that are not one's neighbours. Conflict occurs when there is clash of interest and that can happen with countries that are far distant from one's own. Iraq and the US are a case in point. This aspect can be overlooked, but only at one's own peril.

"Security" and "threat" are cognate words and one may be forgiven for using them in a fungible manner. Any discourse on security must of necessity take into consideration the entire threat scenario and the consequent strategic footprint that would need to be studied by the strategic planners. Any discussion on Bangladesh's security scenario has to be done in the context of the regional developments, and that must also be done within several parameters like the reconcep-tualisation of the term "security," nature of future conflicts, and the special features of the South Asian system.

Even when one indulges in the traditional security discourse, the inevitable question that follows is, what are the generic sources of threat that we might face in the years ahead? One eminent scholar enumerates several interesting threat scenarios, apart from that of a big neighbour dominating the smaller countries of the region.

He states that, loss of state monopoly over information due to technological revolution in electronic media, failure of the state to protect its people, failure to achieve economic prosperity, loss of state's monopoly over justice in view of the growing role of international organisations, lending institutions, foreign governments, human rights groups and self-appointed spokesmen for democracy, failure to provide justice, and threat from within are likely to negatively impact on the security environment of the states and the region.

To this, one could add deprivation from common resources or inability of a country to make legitimate and optimum use of common natural endowments that might be of concern to a country's security and might compel, in certain circumstances, employment of the military, as a guarantor of national interest, i.e. of national security.

The predominance of the India factor was markedly noticeable in the paper. Given the geo-strategic disposition of Bangladesh, the India factor can hardly be placed at the margins of this discourse. The strategic location of Bangladesh being what it is -- the tyranny of geography making us "India locked" on three sides -- that any discussion of our security would be predicated on and revolve around our largest neighbour is only natural.

While nobody can deny India's preeminent position in the region, its smaller neighbours view with apprehension India's attempt to translate its pre-eminence into pre-dominance. Also of significance is the fact that with 52 of the 53 rivers running in from India, ensuring our major source of sustenance is highly suspect. Insofar as Bangladesh's geo-strategic importance apropos India is concerned it is the contiguity with the Seven Sisters states of India's North-East that has accorded Bangladesh the strategic weight. One wonders whether Bangladesh would have attracted the attention from India that it does now, had it been located in any other part bordering India?

But threat is also a relational phenomenon that is predicated on the capabilities and intentions of powers with which one has adversarial relationship. According to the author of the paper, Bangladesh predominates India's strategic thinking and has even surpassed concerns that stem from Pakistan. Thus, while there may be some rationale in the major thrust of his arguments regarding the primary source of threat for Bangladesh, one would have liked to hear from the author what he saw as the most likely action of India to mitigate the threat it perceives emanating from Bangladesh.

One finds it difficult to rationalise some of the options that he sees are open to India. And this is why. Analysts, particularly the optimists amongst them, see the end of the Clausewitzian way of settling interstate disputes. Primarily there are three compelling reasons for war no longer being made an extension of politics.

First, it will no longer be the norm for civilised nations to take to arms to solve intractable matters between one another (notwithstanding aberrations like the Iraq invasion by the US).

Second, the cost benefit criterion will impose restraint on prospective antagonists. For the victor, if there be any at the end of the day, the victory would be at best pyrrhic.

Third, war may not necessarily bring peace. What, however, cannot be discounted are the possibilities of mistrust and misunderstanding between states finding expression in the form of "violence" and "conflict" rather than large-scale wars. Experts also foresee the possibility of intra-state war compelled by internal dynamics and festered by external linkages and sponsorship. Thus, the "proxy war" merits strong rationale.

The author in his introduction also alluded to the fact that the military, by implication, is entrusted with the responsibility of preventing state collapse from within. What was missing in the paper was any mention of the internal dynamics that might need the military's intervention to restore the integrity of the state. It would have been enlightening to hear the nature of the threats or the various developments within Bangladesh that might have a negative bearing on our comprehensive security. Without a discussion on this aspect, deliberation on the security of Bangladesh will remain incomplete.

While the counter-measures to meet the challenges are many, some discussants at the seminar appeared to have been taken in by the concept of cooperative security, which is in place in Europe. While that can be a separate topic of discussion, suffice it to say that replication of a model of a region, whose inter-state dynamics have evolved through time, and where similarity of views and common perception match more than clash, is fraught with danger.

It is imperative that we analyse the threat scenario in the correct perspective. Only then would it be possible to assess our security concerns. Only after that will we be able to obtain rational inputs for strategic planning which would allow us to evolve a security policy and help formulate pro-active policies. This must be done without overemphasising on any one aspect while soft peddling on others.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.