Asia has not been in the forefront of the human rights revolution till very recently. This is probably because of the ongoing debate as to whether human rights as understood in the West is compatible with questions of cultural relativism as existing in Asia. Some have also disagreed with regard to the primacy of social, economic and cultural rights as opposed to civil and political rights.

Nevertheless, the nineties have seen the emergence of different kinds of national human rights commissions. A conscious effort has been undertaken to juxtapose international human rights norms within cultural contexts. This decision to meet 'the human rights challenge' has also in its own way contributed to the alteration of domestic political structures. The interesting aspect in this context has been the reluctant loss of 'domestic sovereignty' arising out of the need to conform to transnational human rights expectations.

In many cases governments appear to have also formed and strengthened these commissions to appease international actors. This evolutionary process might even be described as partial transformation of sovereignty where states are now being held accountable for their actions or inaction against the backdrop of acceptable state behaviour.

This emerging format has acquired special significance because of the existing relationship between state sovereignty and human rights. The state's right to have the last word within its structure is being challenged. A large number of transnational actors (consisting of non-governmental organisations, international organisations, foreign governments, private foundations and individual activists) have today created a network that monitor different state activities and the way a state treats its citizens.

Some jurists have spent a great deal of time on the antithetical nature of the human rights agenda. Richard Falk, one may recall, highlighted this contradictory aspect in the early 1980s. He went to the extreme and suggested that global civil society could override the state's sovereign prerogative. The early 1990s saw an equally important contribution by Kathryn Sikkink who wanted to 'reconceptualize' the tenuous and complex linkages between state sovereignty and practice of human rights. Her belief was reflected in the agenda of many NGOs who felt that human rights activism produced 'material and moral pressures' that gradually induced 'states to concede certain sovereign prerogatives.'

This approach has however come under some criticism. Jurists have pointed out that in many cases such pressure has mostly been limited to economically disadvantaged countries. They have also noted that politics of mineral resources have precluded the possibility of universality. This international system has been described by Stephen Krasner as 'organised hypocrisy.'

In Asia and Pacific region, national human rights commissions have been a relatively new phenomenon. One could say that the concept has been principally advocated actively within the multilateral fora. As opposed to permanent multilateral bodies, such institutions are meant to broaden the acceptability of the human rights culture.

According to Sonia Cardenas, eight such national commissions have emerged in the Asia-Pacific region till end 2001. They have been formed in the Philippines (1987), in India (1993), in Indonesia (1993), in Sri Lanka (1997), in Fiji (1999), in Malaysia (2000), in Nepal (2000) and in Thailand (2000). Concrete plans are also underway in at least six other Asian countries to establish similar commissions -- Bangladesh, Cambodia, Japan, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea and South Korea. This process has been facilitated through the Asia-Pacific Forum for National Human Rights Institutions. Other domestic factors have also facilitated this evolution. This has included changes in autocratic government structures, commitment of national leaders and presence of non-state human rights groups.

One interesting aspect in this process has been the great diversity in the background and national cultures of some of these countries. For example, India, Philippines and Indonesia all vary greatly. One is largely Hindu, the other a predominantly Roman Catholic Christian country and the last the world's most populous Muslim nation. They have also had different colonial pasts -- British, Spanish and Dutch. One thing however was common -- their perception that creation of a national commission would enhance their international image. It might have been seen as a tool of democratisation by some, but economic incentives as well as acceptable international norms appear to have been the determinant factors in the evolving equation.

In India in particular, a 'wide range of observers' has viewed the creation of a national commission as an attempt 'to appease' international actors. This was seen as being internationally inspired and in response to the criticisms that were made in 1991 and 1992 by international economic donors. The Indian government has however seen the formation of the National Human Rights Commission as a movement forward. They have always pointed out that India's parliament had earlier created two related national commissions in 1990 (National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and a National Commission for Women), as well as a National Commission on Minorities in 1992.

Nevertheless, whatever be the truth, one thing is without question. India has led the way for other national human rights commissions, both regionally and internationally. It in turn has also benefited from its extensive ties to international actors. Despite recent glitches with Amnesty International over unfortunate events in Gujarat, the Indian Commission regularly receives delegates from the European Parliament, the United States Congress and Commonwealth human rights institutions.

Nepal, Sri Lanka and Malaysia appear to have also agreed to the creation of their commissions due to over external pressure. They have in this regard received direct technical assistance from the United Nations.

The United Nations Development Programme has also been assisting the government of Bangladesh since 1996 in laying the foundations for a national human rights commission. This has included providing consultants to assist in drafting legislation and organising symposia on the subject. Other international bodies and some western countries have also given financial assistance to promote awareness of human rights norms. They are playing the crucial role of facilitating acceptance at multiple levels both in terms of structure as well as effectiveness.

Unfortunately, however, despite repeated violations of various human rights norms, two successive governments have been unable to constitute a national human rights commission in Bangladesh. Although many trips have been taken abroad by interested parties and local consultants, at the end of the day, nothing concrete has emerged as yet. It appears that insufficient political will is not the only culprit. Government officials entrusted with the job of establishing such a commission have also not shown the desired level of interest and commitment.

We must not forget that a national commission of human rights in Bangladesh will enhance credibility of the process of governance. I believe that domestic sovereignty will not be reduced by initiating such a mechanism. It will only strengthen it. The state will be able to exert its authoritative control in the national realm more effectively. A broad spectrum of issues, ranging from questions of custodial death and prison conditions to the rights of the mentally ill and problems of child labour can then receive systemic attention. The existence of such a commission can also act as a buffer and save face for the government by pointing out that certain issues have to be off the agenda because of national security sensitivities.

Time is of the essence. Establishing a neutral national human rights commission in Bangladesh will only enhance our image. It will make the state machinery more responsible for its actions towards the citizens. It might end up recommending that the government compensate victims in cases of illegal detention and severe torture. This should however not be a cause for anxiety. State officials instead of seeing it as a challenge to their authority should treat its potential investigative activity as a supporter of the legitimate scope of state authority on the societal and state fronts.

We are facing today a challenge with regard to the observance of human rights in various facets of our lives. Creating a national human rights commission should not be seen as ceding sovereignty to any external authority. It should be accepted as part of the dynamics of proper governance.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.