Committed to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 4 Num 227 Wed. January 14, 2004  
   
Editorial


Panorama
Winds of change in South Asia
Is Kashmir solution in the offing?


Of late the people of South Asia are feeling euphoric. And there is a good reason for them to feel that way. Recently, there has been a historic meeting between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani President Musharraff on the sidelines of 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad January 4-6, 2004. Both have pledged to open the stalled peace dialogue from next month and declared their confidence in settling the vexed Kashmir dispute. So every segment of the society in India and Pakistan barring the zealots from both sides, who thrive on conflictual politics, is thrilled at the prospect of the potential normalisation of Indo-Pak relations thereby removing half-a-century's mistrust, suspicion and hostility between the two. Obviously, normalisation means potential solution of Kashmir.

Now that the top leadership of India and Pakistan are confident in settling the Kashmir imbroglio people naturally feel relieved and joyous. For more than half a century Kashmir dispute stood in the way of normalisation between the two. It brought as many as three wars, dreadful Kargil conflict in the backdrop of a potential nuclear war, and untold miseries to millions, who have been deprived of their basic rights due to the diversion of scarce resources to military expenditure. Decades went by without any possible solution in sight. This was because both sides remained adamant in pursuing a military solution to the problem although neither side could establish their respective viewpoints despite huge military spending and military presence in their respective administered portion of Kashmir. Recent changes in international and domestic dynamics including Kashmir brought forth before India and Pakistan that military solution to the problem was not feasible and there was a need for a negotiated settlement.

Kashmir issue is extremely complex pertaining to the ideological riddle of Indian and Pakistani nationalism. The policies pursued by India and Pakistan since 1947 have created a seemingly intractable situation, which needs concerted efforts of all. Naturally, advent of peace process in late 1990s has not been easy. Vajpayee's famous bus trip to Lahore in 1999 and the Lahore Accord with its accompanying euphoria went up in smokes in the Kargil intrusion. Subsequent gestures shown by each side that culminated into Vajpayee-Musharraff Summit of 2002 in Agra also slid back to square one when it ended without a joint communiqué

. Each time it was Kashmir. Each time it was the divergent positions taken by New Delhi and Islamabad on Kashmir that spoiled the broth. The path has been so rocky that even after exchange of goodwill gestures and visits by top leadership, South Asia witnessed India and Pakistan amassing millions of troops along LoC following alleged Pakistani terrorists' attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2002. However, belying all apprehensions these two South Asian adversaries have been back on track when Vajpayee suddenly declared in April 2003 that India was ready to resume dialogue and that it was his last attempt for peace in his life time.

This (the declaration) was indeed surprising as it came from the same person, who, in December 2002, irately snapped all means of communication with Pakistan and thought Pakistan fit for a "pre-emptive" attack following the American model of Iraq invasion. Surprise or not he did make the offer that was enthusiastically responded by Pakistan raising renewed hopes for peace in the region. And the January meeting of Vajpayee and Musharraff has been the culmination of a well thought out and cautious steps taken by both India and Pakistan. No decision was hurriedly taken not even the decision to have the meeting although Pakistan floated the idea immediately following Vajpayee's declaration in April. But India waited for the right kind of gestures and development before agreeing for it. What happened was that the usual development like renewing the diplomatic and other communication links took place with a lot of humdrum with media's extensive coverage. But behind the formal activities there have been series of significant gestures by Islamabad like declaration of cease-fire along the LoC that was reciprocated by India and former's assurance to the latter to take steps to choke "cross-border" infiltration -- something New Delhi has been demanding for a long time particularly after April of 2003 as a precondition for a meaningful dialogue. The real breakthrough came when the Pakistani President broke a long-held taboo by declaring that Pakistan has "left aside" the United Nations Security Council resolution for a solution to Kashmir. New Delhi was thrilled. All these paved the way for the Summit. Although the detail discussion of the Summit has not been divulged but the fact that both feel confident in settling the Kashmir dispute signify that New Delhi also has shown flexibility by allowing Kashmir as an issue that needs to be discussed in a declared statement.

These developments are indeed encouraging. Will Kashmir dispute be really solved? This million dollar question is being asked again and again as if it is too good to believe that winds of change are really blowing in South Asia and these adversaries would cast aside their old prejudices and move towards a lasting peace by solving the core issue of Kashmir. Critiques, however, point-out that all these have come about due to American pressure and its involvement in Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir. And India has come to the present state by carefully watching the progress made in Pakistan under the US "tutelage." True, US is playing a very significant role in bringing these countries face to face so that they can resort to a meaningful dialogue. The fact is that Washington needs both India and Pakistan for various reasons. It wants to have a closer link with India for economic and strategic reasons whereas it must have Pakistan on its side in its war on terrorism. None of these are possible if Indo-Pak impasse continues. Resolution of Indo-Pak conflict is, then, in the interest of Washington (also the interest of South Asia). It is, thus, putting tremendous pressure on both, especially on Pakistan to take concrete steps so that a conducive environment is created for holding the peace talks. Pakistan did take concrete steps. Cease-fire declaration along LoC in November 2003, assurance to New Delhi to choke "cross-border" infiltration and moving away from Pakistan's insistence on holding a plebiscite to resolve Kashmir dispute are significant in this respect. New Delhi agreeing to include Kashmir in upcoming talks in February is also perhaps the result of Washington's gentle cajoling of India.

But will it be fair to conclude that all the positive development that have taken place, including initiation of the peace process, have been due to American pressuring? Sure there is pressure from Washington on both India and Pakistan but there are several factors independent of American pressure that indicate that genuine change are in the offing. First, there seems to be a genuine desire for peace by both India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee has several things in mind. At the fag end of his career more than anything he wants is a place in history. Achieving peace with Pakistan while keeping India's national interest in tact surely can get him that long cherished dream. But he is not motivated by this factor alone. He realises the ground realities in Kashmir and their jihadi implications, and how volatile they can be if Pakistan does not move away from its present path. A situation which Pakistan also comprehends. After years of dancing with the Jihadies in Kashmir and Talibans in Afghanistan Islamabad is now almost caught in its own trap, especially in the context of its decision to join the war against terrorism. As many as three assassination attempts on Musharraff's life is enough to demonstrate these terror groups' capacity to destabilise the country. Jihadies and terrorists are now notorious words in the political lexicon of the country.

War against terror is now a common agenda for both India and Pakistan. Second, it is doubtful whether Islamabad's decision to rethink plebiscite in Kashmir, which indeed broke the ice paving the way for Vajpayee-Musharraff meeting, has been the doing of the Americans despite US's noteworthy leverage and influence in Pakistan. Islamabad's gestures may have come forth somewhat due to American pressure but mostly they have emanated from its failed Kashmir policy and a realisation that continuation of the old policy in the long run would hurt Pakistan more than India. Islamabad knows that given the ground realities plebiscite is no longer possible as a major section of Kashmiris would not opt for either independence or for Pakistan. Moreover, such a move may ignite serous communal frenzy in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan, over the years, has also lost international support for its position on Kashmir and most notably from its brotherly Muslim countries of the Middle East. Its influence within Kashmiri leadership is also on decline as evidenced by the spilt in Hurriyat Conference, which left Pakistan having the support of small Geelani faction whereas Indian leadership after stubbornly resisting to talk to Kashmiri leaders, opened dialogue with Maulan Abbas Ansari's majority faction Hurriyat Conference, and have neutralised it.

Majority Kashmiris are also wary of violence. They want peace and do not want to get entangled in Pakistan's endeavour to 'liberate' them. Third, the people of South Asia also are wary of continued hostility between the two that has hampered the integration of the region. For years the civil society through Track II diplomacy have propagated peace and better relations between the two. Now through Track III -- the people to people contacts have enhanced. They all are in favour of peace and normalisation of relations through the resolution of Kashmir problem. Their genuine desire for peace has been discerned by their positive and joyous reactions at recent Vajpayee-Musharraff meeting. They have been thrilled at the prospects of peace in the region. And lastly, the segment of Indian and Pakistani leadership, which could pose threats to any impending peace between the two, are themselves in its favour. The BJP in India, which accused Congress of giving Kashmir a special status in the Constitution and making compromise on Indian nationalism by making it a disputed area, now recognises it as disputed and is in the forefront of settling the Kashmir dispute through negotiation. But it has such impeccable nationalistic credentials, especially following the nuclear detonation of 1998, that nobody not even a nationalistic Indian can accuse BJP of going against India's interest at the cost of pleasing Pakistan. Consequently, by taking the peace initiative and going for it BJP has taken the sail out of Congress's secular front.

Along the Pakistani front the hard liner Pakistan Army, which has been all along in favour of a military solution of Kashmir dispute, at present, is pushing for a negotiated settlement of the issue as well. Even the oppositionist Islamic groups are less belligerent this time. A meeting between Vajpayee and a delegation from the Islamist groups in January 2004 is significant in this respect. With these leadership on broad, the wishes and desire of the people for a lasting peace in South Asia, and Uncle Sam watching over the region, it seems, Kashmir resolution is, indeed, in the offing.

Dilara Choudury is Professor, Govt and Politics, Jahangirnagar University.