Committed to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 4 Num 224 Sun. January 11, 2004  
   
Editorial


End to Indo-pak tension in sight?


Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Sinha struck a positive note at Islamabad. He reportedly said that the very fact that Prime Minister Vajpayee had come to the SAARC summit and met both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Jamali, that he and his Pakistani counterpart had met, that two Foreign Secretaries had met are indicative of peace gestures and confidence building measures. These were preceded by exchange of ambassadors, resumption of air links, cease fire along the line of control in Kashmir, Indian proposal to raise the size of respective missions, technical level talks on resumption of bus links, removal of restrictions imposed on mission personnel in December 2001 etc.

The note of optimism was well founded. In a joint statement issued on 5th January in Islamabad India and Pakistan agreed "to commence" the process of resuming their stalled composite dialogue from next month. They expressed their view that the resumption of dialogue would lead to a peaceful resolution of all bilateral issues "including Jammu and Kashmir to the satisfaction of both sides". While Vajpayee told General Musharraf that for dialogue to be sustained violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented; Pakistani President assured Indian Prime Minister that he would not allow Pakistani controlled territory to be used to support terrorism in any manner. The imminent resumption of talks has not been without criticism in Pakistan.While the President of Pakistan controlled Kashmir welcomed Bajpayee-Musharraf talks as a significant move towards resolving outstanding issues, some Pakistani opposition leaders and Kashmiri militants have accused President Musharraf of pushing the "core issue" of Kashmir to the "side lines". They also underlined the need to include Kashmiris in the Indo-Pak talks. Jamat-e Islami Chief Qazi Hasan Ahmed accused Pakistani leadership of "conceding defeat" on Kashmir issue under US pressure and threatened to raise the subject in the Parliament. President Musharraf was at pains to assure his critics that he had not "sold out" Kashmiri interests by agreeing to resume dialogue which , he saw, as comprising of three inter-linked issues forward movement in confidence building measures, initiation of composite dialogue on all issues including Kashmir, and Pakistani resolve not to allow Pakistani territory by terrorists. It is interesting to note that both the British Foreign Secretary and the French Foreign Minister telephoned Jaswant Sinha on the eve of his departure for Islamabad to express their appreciation of the Indian peace initiative with Pakistan.

Vajpayee's decision to go to Pakistan made possible the holding of the SAARC summit. Reportedly the Americans including President Clinton were involved in encouraging the two intractable "enemies" to shake hands. If the two countries eventually resolve their differences it will not only put to rest global anxiety over South Asia being "the most dangerous place in the world"; it will also help increase manifold Indo-Pak trade amounting to $1.5 billion now being conducted illegally or through third countries; increased intra-SAARC trade and investment and cooperation in myriad other fields now thwarted by existing tension between the two countries. No less importantly G-8 and other important entities who now consider dialogue with SAARC as a whole to be waste of time and prefer to have individual countries as dialogue partners would feel encouraged to deal with SAARC as a bloc thereby giving the smaller countries with a platform to interact with the important players. The benefits of resolution of Indo-Pak rivalry would be immense for the region and for the countries concerned who would be able to divert precious money now being spent on defense to more productive areas.

The inescapable question remains whether the two countries would be able and willing to cut the Gordian knot. Can the partition of India based essentially on the premise that a homeland was needed for the Indian Muslims can be questioned more than fifty years after the fact through the agreement of Pakistan to allow Muslim majority Kashmir to remain an integral part of India? Equally can an India ruled by a non-secular party( most major partner of the National Democratic Alliance) , enthused by its recent gains in the three state elections, be able and willing to give Pakistan as yet undefined "concessions" while planning to advance the general elections for yet another mandate from the people? One should not forget that while foreign affairs may not figure prominently to the voters in many developed countries in the sub-continent relations with neighbors often determine fate of political parties.

It would be naïve to gloss over the difficulties in taking forward the process of Indo-Pak rapprochement. Despite President Musharraf's legitimacy having been approved by the federal and provincial assemblies through a uniquely Pakistani style constitutional amendment; the last two assassination attempts on President Musharraf would make foreign negotiators unsure and nervous about the stability of the present regime. Both the Indians and the Americans know very well that the final arbiter of Pakistan's fate is the army. Therefore in a sense in case of political change policy changes may not be seismic because decisions being corporate change in the position of the chairman of the board may only reflect stylistic and not fundamental change. One however has to take into account that like most organizations Pakistan army, despite discipline being instilled in it, consists of disparate elements. According to Delhi based South Asia Intelligence Review( of 29.12.03) things are never entirely clear in Pakistan and that the establishment having bedded with the terrorists for so long may find disengagement far from simple or inevitable. The Review adds that both the attacks on President Musharraf reflect high level of complexity as well as complicity within at least a section of the establishment. What was astonishing is that both the attacks occurred within a hundred yards of one another at the GHQ, the most militarized city in a militarized country; they occurred in high security cantonment area; on the President's daily route. In the first attack( on December 14) over half a ton of explosives had been transported to and then unloaded, concealed and primed at a bridge which is heavily guarded round the clock. The audacity with which Al-Qaida leader Ayman al Zwahiri's call to get rid of " Musharraf the traitor who sold the blood of the Muslims in Afghanistan" was implemented had perhaps goaded The Washington Post to advise Bush administration to reconsider its heavy reliance " on a single General, Pakistan's Parvez Musharraf, to maintain stability in one of the world's most dangerous areas". New York Times disagreed by quoting a senior Western diplomat in Islamabad who credited General Musharraf of gradually stabilizing the country. The diplomat predicted that even if General Musharraf had been killed Pakistan's no. 2 pro-western General would have taken control of the country's nuclear arsenal. Some Pakistani scholars, however, feel that General Musharraf's rule is simply keeping a lid on the country's political and ethnic tensions and not resolving them. His sudden disappearance would cause chaos, disorder and instability.

Perhaps because of the assassination attempts President Bush had to reassure the world that Pakistani nuclear weapons were in secure hands. He also advised both India and Pakistan to have "a secure nuclear weapons program". President Bush described President Musharraf as "a stand-up-guy when it comes to dealing with terrorists" and commended his cooperation in dealing with Al-Qaida. Questions had however been raised in the past about the reliability of Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror. Political analyst Matt Thundyil (Pakistan Facts30.12.03) likened the US alliance with Pakistan with that with the Soviet Union in 1941 "in the fight against what is perceived to be a greater evil. In reality, like the Soviet Union then, Pakistan is part of evil it purports to be fighting". He claims that Pakistan's cooperation on war on terror resulted from the choice given to Pakistani leaders by Richard Armitage either to cooperate or to be bombed to Stone Age. It is significant that CATO Institute's Handbook prepared for the US Congress containing policy recommendations advised (a) to reassess economic and military ties with Pakistan as part of a policy of US "constructive disengagement" from an unstable military regime; (b) reject plans to establish long term military presence in Pakistan; (c) treat India as the central player in the US war on terror and radical Islamisation in South Asia; and (d) resist call for mediation in Kashmir dispute. As recent as last November Congressional Research Service in a report on International Terrorism in South Asia concluded that Taliban elements who had fled Afghanistan remained active on Pakistani territory. This is facilitated by the fact that Pakistan's western regions are populated by conservative ethnic Pashtuns who share intimate religious and tribal linkages with their counterparts in Afghanistan holding vehement anti-western and anti-US sentiments. Consequently despite Pakistan's crucial cooperation in the war on terror US is concerned about the vast "lawless zone" along Afghan-Pakistan border. US Senators Richard Luger and Joseph Biden are reported to have voiced worries that elements of Pakistan's elite intelligence agency might be helping members of Taliban and perhaps even Al-Qaida members. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly observed that "affection for working with us" did not extend up and down the rank and file of Pakistani security community. Additionally many of the about ten thousand religious schools in Pakistan regularly churn out students imbibed with anti-western and anti-American sentiments.

Indo-Pak rapprochement desired by all, particularly their South Asian neighbors, can not take place in isolation of the global war on terror. Though Jaswant Sinha (interview with Friday Times25.12.03) dismissed Pakistan stand that Kashmir was the "core" problem between the two countries and asserted that "the real problem is Pakistan's compulsive hostility towards India'; Colin Powell expressed his view (Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2004) that Indo-Pak dispute mainly centered around as to who would control Kashmir, a dispute which could have flared into a major war between the two in 2002 even involving nuclear weapons. He added that working with partners in Europe and Asia US could mobilize help to end the crisis. US efforts in South Asia, according to Powell, are an example of "turning adversity into opportunity".

It is too early to tell what the future holds for Indo-Pak talks given Indian insistence on the legal validity of the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India and the entire state being an integral part of India; Pakistan's change of policy, in Indian view, having been occasioned by its failure in using terrorism and proxy war in Kashmir. On the other hand there remains Pakistan's pursuit of an absurd dream of wresting away Jammu & Kashmir from India to substantiate the raison d'etre of the birth of Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims. Given the wide gulf still remaining between the two combatants it is essential that the US and Europe remain seized with this issue and not relax their vigil on this two South Asian nuclear armed countries whose animus towards each other continues to regress the pace of socio-economic development in this desperately poor region of the world.

The author is a former secretary and ambassador