In the following piece, retired military officer and diplomat, M. Shahidul Islam (also author of two books on the politics of Bangladesh military) looks back at the military significance of that fateful day and reminisces the legacy that still hovers over the military's morale and discipline.

Every nation experiences vicissitudes in history as unexpected political eruptions can change the course of events and distort perceptions. In South Asia, assassinations of Mahatma Gandhi and Sheikh Mujib stand out as exceptional aberrations since both the leaders steered their nations toward independence and least expected such tragic ends to their lives.

The dawn descended on August 15, 1975 with a different sun- shine in various military garrisons of Bangladesh. Members of Bangladesh armed forces learnt that morning that a faction of their fellow members had overthrown an elected government, killed the leader and took over power by disavowing the very command structure they were trained to obey unto death.

One would have expected such a moment to be accompanied by counter-moves to quell the mutineers, but the day rolled on without any such attempts by competent authorities in the military's chain of command. The incidence carried with it something ominous than what met the eyes although the mutineers interpreted the passive silence as a vindication of the mayhem they'd orchestrated before the day- break. For astute observers, however, it symbolized the helplessness of a nation suddenly divested of political authority.

Historically, the mutiny on 15 August fits into a classical model. It, however, rivals other mutinies due to the uniqueness of its ferocity, cruelty and barbarism. It's also conspicuously distinguishable from many uprisings that had marred the history of this region beginning with the Bengal army's first revolt against the British Raj in 1857 through the mutiny of Bengali soldiers in 1971.

In 1857 and again in 1971, the Bengal army ruptured the chain of command to express anger against alien colonial powers. In 1975, Bangladesh army killed a leader who'd freed the Bengali nation from an alien domination.

The mutineers that day moved independent of their chain of command -- with a flawlessly crafted plan shrouded in extreme secrecy-- to mercilessly kill Sheikh Mujib and most of his family members. And, their decision to replace Mujib with Mustaq indicated the extent of divisiveness that had permeated the leadership of the Mujib regime and its military command hierarchy.

Mujib and military

To posit that 15 August occurred in a vacuum is to negate the underlying interactions between causes and effects in any socio-political upheaval. The Bangladesh military, then, was a hybrid coalescence of elements with diverse motivation and doctrinal denomination. The heterogeneity of the force's composition was exacerbated by the ineptness of its leadership that lacked in requisite experience. Many of the military's top brass comprised officers catapulted from majors to major generals to fill the vacuum created by the captivity in Pakistan of senior officers who would have joined the war and formed the basis of a national army along with other freedom fighters. Consequently, at the dawn of independence, the military was a hybrid force with hung command.

In the civil polity too, student leaders of yesterday turned cabinet ministers likewise and demagogues masqueraded as leaders. Economically, Sheikh Mujib took the reign of a tattered nation awaiting reconstruction from war ravages; amid a run-away inflation that ran as high as 300 percent at times. Mujib also faced stiff resistance internally from radical elements like the JSD while the nation's international friends were few and far between.

Countries that stood by Bangladesh constituted a pool of cash-starved nations branded as socialistic due to the Cold War's partisan impact on them as allies of the USSR. Viewed by the world as a clientele of the Indo-Russian axis in the hotly contested bipolar world, Dhaka's isolation was painfully troubling, but almost unavoidable.

Of all the foreign friends, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia loved Mujib as a charismatic hero among third world leaders. Tito's generosity endowed Mujib with massive military contribution that arrived from the former Yugoslav republic to build the military from the scratch.

As Mujib banked on his newly built military machine to act as a saviour of national sovereignty, a section of the military teetered with vengeance ever since his decision in 1972 to create a paramilitary force known as Rakhi Bahini. The military viewed this auxiliary force as its rival, vying for the budget and perks that the military alone should have had a monopoly over.

The polarization of sentiments on this and many other issues was aided by the prevalence of widespread poverty, unemployment and a slow pace in necessary reconstruction of the war ravaged nation. The prevalent handicaps of the regime aided the mutineers to proceed with their desired plan.

Command channel upstaged

The rupture of the chain of command left an indelible mark in the psychology and discipline of men in uniform. The helplessness of General Shafiullah, then Chief of Army Staff (CAS); General Zia's elevation as the new CAS; dominance of the nation's polity by the mutineers and their henchmen; and the subsequent counter putsch by General Khaled Mosharrof on November 3 conjured up the dreadful imagery of a failed nation. The politicisation of soldiers further cracked into open as troops revolted on November 7 under Colonel Taher-- a retired freedom fighter officer of distinctionand managed to rescue Zia from captivity.

Zia and Taher were men from different poles; Taher an ideologue of the JSD and Zia a disaffected soldier stung by the pain of his relegation of status as Mujib chose his junior colleague, Shafiullah, to fill the slot of the new CAS. However, the Zia- Taher honeymoon did not last long and ended in tears. The not-so-dispassionate relationship between the two reached a fever pitch within months and Zia obliterated Taher by hanging him by the neck a year later.

Despite Zia's dramatic entry and a meteoric elevation into the army's and the nation's leadership, instability in the military persisted for years, manifesting frequently through a number of coups and mutinies, including Zia's assassination by a group of officers on May 31,1981.

Of the major factions in the military, the freedom fighter and Pakistan returnees were in the forefront of the jockeying that had dominated the early 80s political reality. Following Zia's death, General Ershad made a last ditch attempt to restore discipline in the military, but his endeavours were tainted by his own design to usurp the constitutional mandate vested onto the top ranking soldier of the nation. It thus became a suspect from the outset.

And, by the time General Ershad overthrew the constitutional BNP government of Justice Sattar in late March 1982, hundreds of officers and troops had died in fratricidal skirmishes. Many were forced to relinquish jobs amidst a series of uprisings that had rendered further quest for restoring discipline in the forces highly problematic.

Thus, with the bloodless coup of March 24, 1982, the legacy of 15 August lingered further within the military. Although the virus never withdrew from our body politic ever since, it did subside as the nation's urge for democracy and to building a professional military deterred many other ambitious officers from truncating the country's constitutionally elected governments in the post-Ershad political dispensation.

Withdrawal to barracks, but...

The instability in the military proved too detrimental to the nation due to the military's seemingly inextricable involvement in national affairs for decades. Ershad's removal from power on December 6, 1990 in the wake of an unprecedented mass uprising created a slate for the military to withdraw from all political commitments. But, by then, the nation had paid too heavy a price with respect to the armed forces' neutrality in political affairs.

That notwithstanding, like many other changes that helped shape the democratic governance of the nation's affairs in the 90s, the military too was expected to turn more professional and apolitical, as was demanded of them by the country's constitution. The restoration of the constitutional governance since the early 1990s somewhat stemmed the fear of renewed uprising in the military, but all did not seem as quiet and 'managed' as one would have reasonably expected.

Thus, when the much-feared atavism returned in May 1996 as a faction of the army blamed president A.R Biswas for not following due process to hold-- with respect to the forceful removal of two senior officers without prior consultation with then CAS, Lt.

General ASM Nasim-- it shocked people home and abroad.

General Nasim told this author that 'he simply wanted the president to follow relevant rules and regulations' which, according to him, 'were formulated and approved by the country's parliament.' President Biswas, on the other hand, acted hurriedly on the basis of intelligence reports regarding the discipline of the two concerned officers and needed his immediate intervention as the supreme commander of the forces. He therefore chose to ignore Nasim's requests.

The ensuing showdown resulted in the removal of Nasim and his loyalists from the service. The concerned officers, however, were not found to have kicked off a mutiny in the investigation that followed the May 20 uprising.

Anecdotes for history

Military services are neither mandatory nor essential for a Bangladesh citizen. Qualified citizens join the military by their own volition to serve the nation. Despite the ghost of August 15 hanging around, a number of other factors helped transform Bangladesh military into an efficient force in subsequent years.

Foremost among those factors was the demand for our military forces in various peacekeeping operations around the world. Domestically, with enhanced deference toward democratic governance, much of the pretext for military's interference in constitutional matters withered. Successive regimes also had shown more empathy while dealing with matters military.

Under this changed ambience, the verdict of history did not take time to bounce back in Mujib's favour. Despite some scholars' belief that Mujib had a cynical perception about the role the military played in various third world nations-- and never allowed them to grow bigger than their shadow -- they proved wrong.

For, besides Mujib's due diligence in cobbling together a military force by bringing in armament and equipment from a number of non-aligned nationsincluding battle tanks from Egypthe was credited with little bravado in his life time. The historians, therefore, must exhume such truths from the ashes.

Besides, Mujib's care for the military was known only to people directly involved in military matters. Years ago, Mujib's naval chief, Rear Admiral M.H. Khan, told this author (during a conversation to obtain facts to compile a book) that he once received a phone call from then Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka imploring him not to accept a naval frigate from the USSR.

The call perturbed him and he confided the matter to Mujib. Mujib told Khan, " Are you India's naval chief or Bangladesh's." As Khan shot back saying, "Of course I'm Bangladesh naval chief," Mujib ordered him to accept the frigate without hesitation.

Likewise, the then Bangladesh ambassador to Yugoslavia, ARS Doha (later foreign minister) told this author of Mujib's enthusiasm to obtain Yugoslav military assistance in the early 1970s. " Mujib insisted that I arrange an immediate visit to Bangladesh of Marshal Tito and his defence minister to talk over the proposed gift of military hardware," maintained Doha.

Crime and penitence

The 15 August 1975 was the first in a series of uprisings that had turned Bangladesh into a breeding ground for coup and mutiny in following decades. Interestingly, none of those insubordination and mutiny had gone unpunished, excepting the killing of 1975 that had waited until 1996. Repelling a constitutional indemnity, Mujib's killers too were brought to trial upon the Awami League's coming to power that year. Earlier, the killers of Zia were hanged and many of their accomplices convicted and sentenced by military courts.

Even Ershad too had had his share of penitence by being in prison for years. A threshold of deterrence thus came into being within the military, along with renewed urge for professionalism and commitment to upholding discipline and the nation's constitution at any cost.

By the late 1990s, the armed forces of Bangladesh witnessed the post-1971 generation of officers and soldiers grooming to display high degree of professionalism and being apolitical in outlook and orientation. Bangladesh is proud today of its armed forces and Mujib's blood does have an input in making the military what it is.

As well, the internationalization of military services and the laurels earned by our soldiers in various missions abroad made the military more endeared to the mass and the political leadership. Thus, the military's depoliticisation came through a host of factors; changing realities in domestic and international politics acting as catalysts to such changes.

In five years from now, the armed forces will have a monolithic group of home- grown men and officers with little urge of the kind that had stirred them in the past to shed blood in political jostling.

M. Shahidul Islam is a senior assistant editor of this paper.